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(a) Research topic – scope and limitations 
 
Political parties are important actors in modern democracies
1
 as they ‘can help to 
articulate group aims, nurture political leadership, develop and promote policy 
alternatives and present voters with coherent electoral alternatives.’
2
 Given this 
important position,
3
 it may be argued that political parties should not only claim to 
foster democracy
4
 but also actually apply democratic procedures internally by 
allowing party members to participate in decision making and deliberation. 
Particularly since the Second World War many countries have started to legally 
regulate the internal organisation of political parties in order to guarantee types of 
internal party democracy.
5
 Other countries, by contrast, decided to abstain from any 
form of explicit regulation.  
 
These two different approaches raise questions. First, does the explicit legal 
regulation of the internal functioning of political parties necessarily mean that 
political parties are organised democratically? Put it differently, how much room to 
manoeuvre within a ‘party law’ do political parties actually have? Are there 
regulatory loopholes which have been exploited by political parties? Secondly, does 
the lack of provisions that expressly regulate internal party democracy
6
 necessarily 
mean that there are no rules, for instance in the constitutions of political parties,
7
 
which are supposed to ensure democratic procedures?  
 
                                                 
1
 This was already recognised by Elmer Eric Schattschneider in 1942; see Elmer Eric Schattschneider 
Party Government (1942) 1. 
2
 Susan Scarrow ‘Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives – 
Implementing Intra-Party Democracy’ 2005 NDI Publications 3.   
3
 I will deal in more detail with the importance of political parties in modern democracies in chapter 
II.   
4
 Indeed, one can hardly find a political party which openly admits that it is organised in a 
undemocratic manner. 
5
 For a worldwide overview of party laws that regulate the functioning of political parties, see, the 
database of the National Democratic Institute, available at https://www.ndi.org/db, accessed on 21 
January 2015. 
6
 The terms ‘internal party democracy’ and ‘intra party democracy’ mean the same thing and are 
interchangeable. In this paper I will, however, use the term internal party democracy. 
7
 In contrast to the term ‘party law’, a constitution of a political party is the body of rules that political 
parties give themselves. 
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This paper attempts to expand the knowledge on these issues and therefore seeks to 
get a deeper understanding on the legal regulation of internal party democracy, which 
is widely considered as one of the most controversial topics concerning party 
regulation.
8
 This will be done by carrying out a case study of two constitutional 
democracies that handle party regulation differently.  Germany, known as ‘heart land 
of party law’,
9
 constitutes the example of a state in which the internal organisation 
and functioning of political parties is regulated by both the Basic Law (the German 
Constitution)
10
 and federal laws. South Africa will be provided as the contrast 
example of a state that lacks express provisions that regulate the internal organisation 
and functioning of political parties. This paper does therefore not seek to conduct a 
‘classical’ comparative study as the legal framework of two countries will be 
examined which deal in different ways with internal party democracy. However, this 
research approach promises to create a more holistic – even though certainly not 
complete – image of the challenges of the legal regulation of internal party 
democracy.       
 
Against this background the thesis explores the following research questions: 
 
• What lesson can we learn from Germany (express provisions) and South 
Africa (no express provisions) about the legal regulation of internal party 
democracy? 
 
o How does the legal framework work in Germany? Can one find 
regulatory loopholes? How does the legal framework impact on the 
constitutions of political parties in Germany? 
o How does South Africa handle political parties in terms of internal 
party democracy? Can one find provisions that impact on the internal 
functioning of political parties although there are no explicit state 
provisions in place in this regard? Do the constitutions of political 
parties stipulate forms of internal party democracy although there are 
                                                 
8
 See, eg, Richard Katz ‘Democracy and the Legal Regulation of Political Parties’ USAID Conference 
Paper (2004) 2f. 
9
 Wolfgang Müller and Ulrich Sieberer ‘Party Law’ in Richard Katz and William Crotty (eds) 
Handbook of Party Politics (2006) 435. 
10
 All references hereinafter to ‘Basic Law’ are to the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) for the Federal 
Republic of Germany in the revised version published in the Federal Law Gazette Part III, 
classification number 100-1. 
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no explicit state provisions in place which oblige political parties to 
do so? 
 
These research questions will basically be answered by examining case-law, the 
Constitution of South Africa
11
 and the German Basic Law, national legislation – 
where available, party laws – and constitutions of political parties. Hence, the study 
will be conducted from a formal perspective. Concerning party laws it must be noted 
that there is no commonly accepted definition of the term ‘party law’. Yet, party laws 
are often considered those state laws which specifically refer to the state regulation 
of aspects of internal party organisation and functioning.  For the purpose of this 
dissertation the term ‘party law’ is to be understood in that sense.       
 
It results from the above that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to conduct a field 
analysis by examining the extent to which party members are in reality allowed to 
democratically participate in the activities of a political party. Moreover, this thesis 
will not focus on the question whether the legal regulation of internal party 
democracy is desirable for political parties themselves in terms of preservation or 
extension of power.     
 
(b) Importance of the study  
 
There are several aspects that give rise to this research project. First, a study of 
internal party democracy which focuses on both South Africa and Germany has 
never been done before. Secondly, the South African Constitution contains no 
explicit provision which regulates the manner in which political parties must operate. 
However, the South African Constitution is commonly acknowledged as one of the 
most advanced legal tools worldwide.
12
 Against this background, it seems to be 
worth considering if the South African Constitution may provide ‘alternative 
solutions’ with regard to internal party democracy. Furthermore, due to the fact that 
there are no express provisions that govern internal party democracy in South Africa, 
it appears that this research area has so far been slightly neglected.
13
 Finally, the 
                                                 
11
 All references hereinafter to ‘Constitution of South Africa’ are to the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
12
 See Ian Shapiro The Real World of Democratic Theory (2010) 1. 
13
 However, the South African Institute for Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and 
International Law (SAIFAC) recently held a conference on "Political Rights Since 1994: South 
 4 
legal framework of party regulation in Germany has been into force for nearly 65 
years now. From a South African perspective, it may be interesting to know where 
difficulties have arisen so far. 
 
(c) Structure of the thesis   
 
The structure of the thesis will be as following:  
Chapter II sets out the basis of the case study. I explain in more detail the role and 
function of political parties in a democracy, the importance of participation for a 
democracy, the term ‘internal party democracy’ and its pros and cons. In chapter III, 
I present the situation in Germany by examining the legal framework of party 
regulation and by checking how the legal framework has been implemented in the 





Chapter IV, I turn to the situation in South Africa. I will examine national legislation 
and the Constitution in order to show how they impact on internal party democracy. 
Furthermore, I analyse if rules and procedures in the constitutions of the two major 




) can be found that ensure forms of 
internal party democracy. Finally, I will discuss a path towards the adoption of a 












                                                                                                                                          
African and Comparative Perspectives" where the internal regulation of political parties was 
addressed. The results of the conference are being published in (2014) 30 SAJHR. 
14
 CDU stands for: Christlich Soziale Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany).   
15
 SPD stands for: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany). 
16
 ANC stands for: The African National Congress. 
17
 DA stands for: Democratic Alliance. 
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II BASIS AND BACKGROUND 
 
(a) Why are political parties important for a democracy? 
 
A study that covers the legal regulation of internal party democracy has to start with 
describing the relationship between, on the one hand, political parties and, on the 
other hand, democracy because the discussion about internal party democracy 
actually emerges from this relationship. However, the link between political parties 
and democracy is in detail certainly multilayered and complex.
18
 For the purpose of 
this study, I therefore focus on the main functions that political parties ideally are 
supposed to perform in a democracy.
19
     
 
When the ‘phenomena’ of political parties emerged for the first time, it was not 
unusual that political parties and democracy were seen as a contradiction by scholars. 
The justification given was inter alia that political parties foster the forming of 
groups in society which merely focus on their own interests and thus harm the 
general public interests of the country.
20
 However, over time, it has been found that 





First, political parties are able to pick up demands of society at any time and transfer 
them into policies. Hence, they promote active participation of the citizen in the 
process of political decision-making regardless of general elections.
22
 In that way 
they also create a link between on the one hand the citizens and on the other hand the 
legislative and executive.
23
 Secondly, political parties provide a platform for political 
dialogue and debate. This dialogue helps in clarifying the advantages and 
disadvantages of the various opinions and thereby enables the electorate to 
                                                 
18
 For a detailed study, see, eg, Russell Dalton et al. Political Parties and Democratic Linkage: How 
Parties Organize Democracy (2011). 
19
 The specific role of political parties in Germany and South Africa will be examined in Chapter III 
and IV. 
20
 See Steven Calabresi ‘Political  Parties as Mediating Institutions’ (1994) 61 University of Chicago 
Law Review 1484ff. 
21
 A good overview gives Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond ‘Types and Functions of Parties’ in 
Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond (eds) Political Parties and Democracy (2001) 7f.    
22
 Sigmund Neuman ‘The Party of Democratic Integration’ in Peter Mair (ed) The West European 
Party System (1990) 46. 
23
 Giovanni Sartori Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analyses (2005) 11.  
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distinguish more easily between different views.
24
 Furthermore, the dialogue forces 
political parties to compete in a discussion which generally leads to better outcomes. 
Thirdly, as political parties are in competition for power, they are willing to check 
and monitor the government and thus assist in holding the government accountable.
25
 
Finally, political parties are the main instruments for recruiting people for 
leadership
26
 and, more importantly, in some countries the right to stand for public 
office can in fact only be realised by citizens that are member of a political party.
27
  
Summarising the above, it can be said that political parties are important tools for 
facilitating and entrenching democracy. 
 
As mentioned above, a core function of political parties is to facilitate active 
participation of the citizens in inter alia the process of political decision-making. But 
why is participation important for a democracy? In the next subsection I will discuss 
that matter. 
 
(b) Why is participation important for a democracy? 
 
For very good reasons participation of citizens is considered a central pillar of every 
democracy
28
 as active participation distinguishes democracy from autocratic state 
forms. In other words, the concept of democracy is based on the notion that 
governments must be responsive to the citizens and that this can only be attained by 
giving the citizens, at least to some extent, a say on decisions that affect them.
29
 
Thus, the commitment to participation – be it through participation in order to elect 
representatives, referendums, protest or, for instance, public participation in 
environmental decision-making – is in the nature of democracy itself.  
                                                 
24
 Arthur Schlesinger ‘Can The Party System Be Saved?’ in Patricia Bonomi et al (eds) The American  
Constitutional  System  Under  Strong  and  Weak  Parties (1981) 122f. 
25
 Yigal Mersel ‘The dissolution of political parties: The problem of internal democracy’ (2006) 4 
Int'l. J. Const. L. 91. 
26
 Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond (note 21 above) at 7. 
27
 This is, for instance, the case in countries where the head of state or the head of government 
respectively are not directly elected by the citizens but rather by the members of the majority party in 
the national parliament. In fact, this is the case both in Germany and in South Africa. I will deal with 
that in more detail in Chapter III and IV.      
28
 Kathe Callahan Elements of Effective Governance: Measurement, Accountability and Participation 
(2007) 149.     
29
 Pierre de Vos ‘“It’s my party (and I’ll do what I want to)?”: Internal party democracy and section 
19 of the South African Constitution’ draft paper at 1f. I am thankful to Professor Pierre de Vos who 
gave me this draft paper and permitted me to quote it in my dissertation. The final version is being 
published in (2014) 30 SAJHR. 
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However, as the few examples given show, participation of citizens can come in 
many forms, and indeed the extent to which active participation is needed in a 
democracy is highly controversial. On the one end of the spectrum one can find the 
supporters of the idea of direct or participatory democracy.
30
  This is a form of 
democracy in which the citizens are heavily involved in the process of law and 
policy making.
31
 Hence, there is a strong emphasis on the participative aspects of 
democracy. On the other end of the spectrum one can find those who support indirect 
or representative democracy.
32
 This, by contrast, is a type of democracy in which 
elected representatives act on behalf of the citizens.
33
 Certainly, both approaches 
have their advantages and disadvantages and a more detailed discussion of the 
necessary extent of public participation would go beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.
34
 However, all of the above mentioned allows concluding that both 
political parties and participation of citizens are important for a democracy. Against 
this background, the question must be asked to what extent party members are 
supposed to participate in the activities of political parties and whether this 
participation is supposed to be facilitated in a democratic way. In the next subsection 
I deal with those issues. 
 
(c) What is meant by ‘internal party democracy’? 
 
One could argue that the way political parties are supposed to ‘fit in’ a democratic 
state is twofold. First, and more well-known, there is the notion that the aims, 
activities and programs of political parties must not infringe upon the fundamental 
principles and values of a democratic society. This relates to cases in which goals 
and activities of political parties, for instance, promote terrorism
35
 or right-wing 
                                                 
30
 Kathe Callahan (note 28 above) at 149.  
31
 Theo Schiller ‘Local Direct Democracy in Europe – a comparative overview’ in Theo Schiller (ed) 
Local Direct Democracy in Europe (2011) 10. Switzerland, for instance, has a long tradition of direct 
democracy. 
32
 Kathe Callahan (note 28 above) at 149. 
33
 For more details, see, eg, Theo Schiller ‘Direct Democracy and Theories of Participatory 
Democracy – some observations’ in Zoltán Tibor Pállinger et al (eds) Direct democracy in Europe: 
Developments and Prospects (2007) 53f. 
34
 See generally John Haskell Direct Democracy Or Representative Government? Dispelling The 
Populist Myth (2001).  
35
 Leslie Turano ‘Spain: Banning political parties as a response to Basque terrorism’ (2003) 1 Int’l. J. 




 One may call this ‘external democracy of political parties’.
37
 This 
topic touches upon many interesting questions but obviously does not fall under the 
subject of this thesis and therefore will not be analysed in any further detail here.
38
 
Secondly, there is the internal democracy of political parties which, by contrast to the 
external democracy of political parties, has been partly neglected for long by 
scholars.
39
 But, what does internal party democracy actually mean?   
 
Indeed, there is no commonly accepted definition of the term ‘internal party 
democracy’. However, formulated in a most general and basic fashion, internal party 
democracy can be described as a method for ‘including party members in intra-party 
deliberation and decision making’
40
 or in other words, the extent to which party 
members can influence the decisions taken by their political party.
41
 It is thus clear 
that the notion of internal party democracy is inter alia embedded in the theory of 
participatory democracy.
42
 To put it differently, those who believe that the main 
function of political parties is not merely to contribute to a stable government but 
rather to extend opportunities of citizen participation are more likely to promote the 
notion of internal party democracy.
43
    
 
However, what exactly does the term ‘internal party democracy’ include? What are 
the ‘ingredients’ of a democratically organised political party? Over time scholars 





                                                 
36
 See, eg, the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court (hereinafter the FCC) NPD-
Verbot (Ban of the NPD) BVerfG, 2 BvB 1/01. 
37
 Yigal Mersel (note 25 above) at 86. 
38
 See generally on undemocratic actors in a democracy Gregory Fox and Georg Nolte ‘Intolerant 
Democracies’ (1995) 36 Harv. Int'l. L. J. 1 or William Downs Political Extremism in Democracies: 
Combating Intolerance (2012). 
39
 See, eg, Ingrid van Biezen ‘Constitutionalizing Party Democracy: The Constitutive Codification of 
Political Parties in Post-war Europe’ (2012) 42 British Journal of Political Science at 188 regarding, 
inter alia, internal party democracy and the relevance of constitutions. 
40
 Susan Scarrow (note 2 above) at 3.   
41
 Josh Maiyo ‘Preaching Water, drinking Wine? Political Parties and Intra-Party Democracy in East 
Africa: Considerations for Democratic Consolidation’ Paper presented at the ASC Leiden Seminar 
Series (2008) 3.  
42
 Ibid at 3. 
43
 Dieter Grimm ‘§14 Politische Parteien’ in Ernst Benda et al (eds) Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1994) para 38. 
44
 For a list of characteristics, see, Yigal Mersel (note 25 above) at 95 and the references there in 
footnote 55. 
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First, the members of a political party must be able to nominate those who will be the 
party’s candidates for the upcoming local and general elections.
45
 This includes 
candidates in, for instance, single member constituencies or on a party list.
46
 
Secondly, and sometimes overlapping with the first point, the members of a political 
party must be entitled to elect the leadership of their political party.
47
 Thirdly, 
political parties have to comply with the principle of periodic elections.
48
 In other 
words, every selection process must take place again after a certain period of time 
has elapsed. Fourthly, the members of a political party must be able to participate 
democratically in the process of policy making.
49
 Fifthly, election processes and 
every other from of participation of the party members in the activities of their party 
must comply with the principle of majority rule.
50
 Sixthly, minorities within the 
political party as well as aspects of gender and race must be represented 
proportionally.
51
 Seventhly, political parties have to guarantee freedom of association 
and freedom of speech within the political party itself and thus must particularly 
tolerate the establishment of party fractions.
52
 Eighthly, political parties must commit 
themselves to transparency. This means in particular that they have to disclose 
information regarding party funding.
53
 Ninthly, political parties have to ensure 
fundamental rights for their party members. For instance, the decision to expel a 
party member has to be procedurally fair.
54
 Finally, political parties have to submit 
themselves to the jurisdiction of an independent judicial body for reviewing matters 
which relate to internal party democracy.
55
             
 
                                                 
45
 Susan Scarrow (note 2 above) at 7; for more details, see, eg, Gideon Rahat ‘What Is Democratic 
Candidate Selcetion?’ in William Cross and Richard Katz (eds) The Challenges of Intra-Party 
Democracy (2013) 136.   
46
 Gideon Rahat (note 46 above) at 136. 
47
 Yigal Mersel (note 25 above) at 95. 
48
 Jörn Ipsen ‘Art. 21 Parteien’ in Michael Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (1999) para 59. 
49
 Susan Scarrow (note 2 above) at 10.   
50
 Yigal Mersel (note 25 above) at 95. 
51
 Ibid; Pierre de Vos (note 29 above) at 13.  
52
 Yigal Mersel (note 25 above) at 95. 
53
 Susan Scarrow ‘Intra-Party Democracy and Party Finance’ in William Cross and Richard Katz (eds) 
The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy (2013) 150; see also in this regard the ‘My Vote Counts’ 
campaign in South Africa. This campaign ‘has lodged an application at the Constitutional Court on 
the 16 July 2014, for an order declaring that Parliament has failed to fulfil its constitutional obligation 
to enact national legislation to bring about transparency in the private funding of political parties.’ See 
http://www.myvotecounts.org.za/, accessed on 21 January 2015.  
54




Whether or not a political party must comply with all these features to be considered 
internally democratic is controversial.
56
 However, there seems to be, at least in 
principle, agreement that political parties have to meet at least some of these 
requirements to be not clearly considered internally undemocratic. To put it 
differently, if one imagines internal party democracy as circle, some of the above-
mentioned features could be found at the very centre of the circle whereas other 
characteristics could be found on the periphery. The characteristics that form the core 




• selection of those who will be the party’s candidates for the upcoming local 
and general elections by the party members;  
• selection of the leadership of the political party by the party members;   
• participation of the party members in the process of policy making;  
• freedom of speech which means that party members is given the opportunity 
to express their opinions and preferences freely;  
• compliance with the principle of majority rule; 
• compliance with the principle of periodic elections.  
 
In the following country analyses (chapters III and IV) I will mainly be focusing on 
these core features whose non-compliance with strike at the heart of the concept of 
internal party democracy. Yet, it could be argued with good reasons that this list 
should also include transparency with regard to the financial funding of political 
parties. The financial funding of political parties is, however, a subject in its own 
which raises many difficult questions.
58
 A comprehensive study is therefore beyond 
the scope of this dissertation.  
 
                                                 
56
 For instance, the representation of minorities, gender or race aspects within political parties are 
sometimes considered as against the notion of internal party democracy. Regarding issues of gender, 
see Sarah Childs ‘Intra-Party Democracy: A Gendered Critique and a Feminist Agenda’ in William 
Cross and Richard Katz (eds) The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy (2013) 81.      
57
 For similar features, see, eg, Pierre de Vos (note 29 above) at 6 regarding the extent, required by the 
South African Constitution, to which party members must participate in the activities of political 
parties; Yigal Mersel (note 25 above) at 104; Jörn Ipsen (note 48 above) at para 57ff; Augustine 
Magolowondo ‘Democracy within political parties: The state of affairs in East and Southern Africa’ in 
Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa and Lia Nijzink Accountable Government in Africa (2011) 202. 
  
58
 See generally on this topic, eg, Susan Scarrow (note 53 above); for a study about South Africa, see, 
Anthony Butler (ed) Paying for Politics: Party Funding and Political Change in South Africa and the 
Global South (2010).  
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But, before conducting the country analyses, it is important to consider whether or 
not internal party democracy is desirable at all. This is important as this paper is 
based on the notion that at least a minimum threshold of democratic participation is 
needed within political parties.     
 
(d) Is internal party democracy desirable? 
 
Whereas it is commonly accepted that democracy is a desirable goal for a state itself, 
and political parties ought to play a pivotal role in achieving it, this widely shared 
notion does not apply with regard to internal party democracy. This is mainly 
because political parties are in many countries considered private bodies.
59
 
Opponents of the legal regulation of internal party democracy therefore put the 
argument forward that political parties should remain independent of state 
regulation.
60
 This independency is, the argument goes, important for various reasons. 
First, internal party democracy weakens political parties
61
 as it is, for instance, 
counterproductive for party discipline.
62
 Moreover, internal party democracy may 
prevent that political parties select those candidates for local or general election that 
are most likely to get elected by the voters.
63
 This in turn means that the political 
success of political parties is at stake.
64
 Secondly, it is argued that it is due to the 
independency of political parties that they are capable of playing a crucial role in a 
democratic state.
65
 Only a non-regulated political party that is independent of the 
state can provide the electoral with proper electoral alternatives.
66
 Finally, it should 
not be the state that decides how democracy within political parties should look like. 
There are actually many different forms of democracy, and if political parties 
become too ‘democratic’ the ‘political system shrinks in its ideological variety.’
67
                  
 
These arguments are certainly not entirely wrong. Actually, they are touching on an 
important subject. Political parties must be given a certain margin of discretion in 
                                                 
59
 Ingrid van Biezen and Daniela Romée Piccio ‘On the Legal Regulation of Internal Party 
Organization’ in William Cross and Richard Katz (eds) The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy 
(2013) 30. 
60
 See, eg, Ingrid van Biezen (note 39 above) at 205. 
61
 Josh Maiyo (note 41 above) at 4. 
62
 Yigal Mersel (note 25 above) at 99. 
63
 Josh Maiyo (note 41 above) at 4. 
64
 Augustine Magolowondo (note 57 above) at 202. 
65




 Yigal Mersel (note 25 above) at 100. 
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terms of the structuring of their internal affairs in order to preserve a degree of 
autonomy from the government.
68
 However, for the following reasons I take the view 
that a minimum threshold of democracy, or in other words, core values of democracy 
need to be applied within political parties. First, the above-mentioned important role 
of political parties for a democracy must again be emphasised. If citizens enjoy the 
right of active and passive democratic participation in their country, this right should 
also apply within those bodies which actually facilitate democracy.
69
 Furthermore, a 
political party that is organised in a democratic manner is rather capable of 
representing the interest of citizens than an undemocratic party.
70
 Secondly, internal 
party democracy may foster party unity as it can prevent the fragmentation of 
political parties through using conflict resolutions based on democratic values such 
as equality.
71
 Thirdly, it is more likely that a country as a whole and especially the 
leadership of a country embraces democratic values if a culture of democracy is 
already applied within political parties.
72
 Finally, internal party democracy may 
prevent political parties with an unaccountable leadership from taking to much power 

















                                                 
68
 Ibid at 101. 
69
 Ibid at 96. 
70
 Augustine Magolowondo (note 57 above) at 202. 
71
 Josh Maiyo (note 41 above) at 2. 
72
 Ibid at 4; Augustine Magolowondo (note 57 above) at 202. 
73




Still under the impression of a fortunately defeated totalitarian system, the drafter of 
the new (West-) German constitution sought to ensure that undemocratic and 
extremist political organisations are never again able to highjack the country.
74
 It is 
against this background that a legal obligation to organise democratically has been 
imposed on political parties in Germany nearly 65 years ago. But how does this legal 
framework work? Is it working effectively? Are political parties in Germany 
organised democratically or are there loopholes in the legal framework which have 
been exploited? In this chapter I will tackle these issues.
75
 First, I will portray the 
country-specific role of political parties in Germany. I will then examine the legal 
framework of party regulation including the Basic Law and party laws, before I turn 
to the constitution of the CDU and SPD. At the end of this chapter I attempt to shed 
light on the enforcement of the legal framework of internal party democracy.        
 
(a) The role of political parties in Germany  
 
Although I already mentioned the significance of political parties in a democracy in 
general, I will now briefly contextualise the importance of political parties in 
Germany.
76
 This seems necessary for two reasons: first, political parties do not act in 
a vacuum but rather in a specific social und legal environment which is why the role 
and importance of political parties varies from country to country. Furthermore, 
some of the remarks I will make below can only be understood properly by providing 
some background knowledge.     
  
The role of political parties in Germany can hardly be underestimated. This is 
already apparent from a look at the Basic Law. Article 21 (1) of the Basic Law inter 
alia states: 
                                                 
74
 Judgment of the FCC KPD-Verbot (Ban of the KPD) 1973 BVerfGE 5, 85 at 138f. 
75
 As is generally known, Germany is a federally structured country in which the 16 states (Länder), 
such as the Free State of Bavaria or Saxony, with their own governments and parliaments play a 
pivotal role in law-making and politics. In accordance with this federal structure, most political parties 
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level. 
76








Article 21 (1) of the Basic Law therefore recognises political parties as necessary for 
the formation of the political will of the people.
78
 However, it is also clear by the 
wording of this article (‘participate’) that political parties are only one instrument 
among others to enable citizens to form the political will.
79
 In particular those 
fundamental rights of the Basic Law which are designed to foster and promote 
democracy, such as freedom of expression
80
 or freedom of assembly,
81
 are certainly 
of similar importance. But this fact does not lessen the significance of political 
parties in Germany. The position of article 21 within the Basic Law or to put it more 
precisely, the mention of political parties in article 21 directly after the important 
article 20, which compromises constitutional principles as sovereignty of the people 
and the right to vote,
82
 clearly indicates the great importance and central role political 
parties are called upon to play in this context. It is therefore not surprising that the 
German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, hereinafter the 
‘FCC’) termed political parties
83
 ‘factors of the constitutional life’
84
 or ‘integrated 
components of the constitutional structure’
85
 and eventually ranked them as a 
‘constitutional “institution”’, which, however, must of course be strictly 
distinguished from official state bodies or authorities.
86
                        
 
The described important role of political parties is, however, not only reflected by 
these specific articles of the Basic Law. Rather, political parties in Germany also 
play a pivotal role in particular when it comes to the formation of government and 
the election of the German Chancellor.        
                                                 
77
 Translated by Christian Tomuschat and David Currie in cooperation with the Language Service of 
the German Bundestag. All English quotations of the Basic Law hereinafter refer to this translation. It 
is available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/ englisch_gg.html#p0114, accessed on 
21 January 2015. 
78
 Jörn Ipsen (note 48 above) at para 5. 
79
 Philip Kunig ‘§ 40 Parteien’ in Josef Isensee and Paul Kirchhof (ed) Handbuch des Staatsrechts der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2005) para 19. 
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 Article 5 of the Basic Law. 
81
 Article 8 of the Basic Law. 
82
 Article 20 of the Basic Law inter alia states:  
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state. 
(2) All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections 
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83
 For further references, see, Jörn Ipsen (note 48 above) at para 8.  
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 Ibid at 225. 
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 Judgment of the FCC Parteispenden (party donations) BVerfGE 52, 63 at 85.  
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The Chancellor is the head of government of Germany and therefore considered to 
hold the most influence and powerful office in the Federal Republic.
87
 However, due 
to the election system, namely the so-called mixed-member proportional 
representation system,
88
 citizens merely elect the members of the Bundestag (the 
German National Parliament) but not the Chancellor directly. The head of 
government is rather appointed by the majority of the members of the Bundestag.
89
 
This actually means that the candidate for Chancellor (Kanzlerkandidat)
90
 either of 
the SPD or CDU becomes the Chancellor.
91
 In other words, in the month leading up 
to the Election Day the two largest political parties in Germany actually determine 
which person will become the Chancellor by appointing their respective candidate 
for Chancellor. On Election Day, the citizens then only vote indirectly for one of the 
candidates. 
 
Furthermore, political parties in Germany perform a main function when it comes to 
government formation, or to put it more precisely, coalition formation.
92
 As I already 
mentioned, neither of the two largest political parties generally obtain the majority of 
the votes in the national elections.
93
 This means that they need to form a coalition 
together or with one of the smaller parties to achieve a majority in parliament. In this 
respect those political parties which want to form a coalition usually conclude a so-
                                                 
87
 Although the President of Germany is the head of state, he or she is mainly supposed to carry out 
representative tasks; see, eg, article 59 of the Basic Law.  
88
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unwritten law that the candidate for Chancellor of the political parties which got the most votes will 
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 that sets out the policy objectives and contents for the 
upcoming parliamentary term.
95
 This agreement, which is internally negotiate in a 
coalition committee by the involved parties outside parliament, forms an important 




These examples clearly show the crucial and maybe even more importantly the very 
powerful role political parties play in Germany. It is against this background that it 
appears reasonable to regulate the internal functioning of political parties. In the next 
subsection I will shed more light on the legal framework governing internal party 
democracy in Germany.        
 
(b) The legal framework governing internal party democracy in Germany 
 
The legal framework which regulates internal party democracy in Germany mainly 
consists of three parts: Article 21 of the Basic Law, the Political Parties Act (Gesetz 
über die politischen Parteien, hereinafter PPA)
97
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 The current coalition agreement concluded by the CDU, CSU and SPD is available at 
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(i) Article 21 (1) of the Basic Law  
 
Article 21 (1) of the Basic Law sets out the basic principle according to which 
political parties are obligated to organise their ‘internal life’ democratically. Article 
21 (1) states:   
 
“Political parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people. They 
may be freely established. Their internal organisation must conform to democratic 





The wording of the emphasised passage is obviously very general. This is, however, 
not unusual but rather a characteristic feature of a constitutional text. But what does 
in particular the term ‘democratic principles’ mean? Or in other words, what are the 
democratic requirements imposed on political parties by the Basic Law? 
 
In my view, it would be wrong to interpret article 21 of the Basic Law in the light of 
one specific theory of democracy. As article 21 of the Basic Law sets out a general 
obligation for all political parties, it cannot be assumed that the drafter of the 
constitution had one specific understanding of democracy in mind (for instance, 
participatory or direct democracy). Article 21 of the Basic Law therefore does not 
require political parties to internally apply the highest conceivable level of 
democracy, which for some might or might not be desirable depending on their 
preferred theory of democracy, but rather wants to ensure a minimum threshold of 
democracy within all political parties. Article 21 of the Basic Law thus leaves it up to 
the each party to implement higher standards, if desired.
100
 This interpretation is also 
supported by the fact that the Basic Law does not require political parties to structure 
in one specific form of organisation. It seems rather appropriate to leave room for 
different models of internal organisation and participation as far as a minimum level 
of democracy is guaranteed. 
 
On the basis of that examination, legal scholars and the FCC have progressively 
named some minimum requirements of democracy which in terms of article 21 of the 
Basic Law must be fulfilled by political parties. Although the debate on the precise 
                                                 
99
 Emphasis added.  
100
 Jörn Ipsen (note 48 above) at para 55. 
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content of article 21 of the Basic Law is not over yet (and maybe will never be over), 
one can identify some features which are commonly accepted.  
 
First, political parties have to be organised ‘from the bottom to the top’ and not the 
other way round.
101
 This means that a party assembly including all party members or 
their elected representatives must be the supreme authority of the party. A leader 
principle (Führerprinzip) or a quasi-dictatorship position of the party executive is 
therefore incompatible with article 21 of the Basic Law.
102
 Furthermore, every party 
member has to have a real opportunity to participate in the activities of the party such 
as policy development.
103
 If, for instance, subdivisions of the party are oversized, this 




Secondly, the holders of party posts have to be elected by the party members or their 
representatives. Or in other words, party posts must be underpinned by democratic 
legitimacy.
105
 Yet, that does not mean that the whole staff of a political party has to 
be elected democratically. Especially those members of staff which merely carry out 
instructions need not to be legitimised by elections.
106
 However, the requirement of 
democratic legitimacy does not only cover party posts such as the leader or the 
executive board of a party but also, of course, the candidates for local or general 
elections.
107
 Another important issue in this context, which is also covered by article 
21 of the Basic Law, is the right of the party members to make proposals regarding 
the nomination of party posts or the party’s candidates for the upcoming elections. 
This is an essential element of freedom of speech.
108
 Moreover, without being able to 
submit such proposals, an election would not longer be democratic but rather a 
process in which the members of a party merely rubber stamp those candidates 
already selected by the party elite.  
      
Thirdly, party posts and the party’s candidates in the upcoming elections must be 
selected periodically as it is a fundamental democratic principle that the exercise of 
                                                 
101
 Judgment of the FCC SRP-Verbot (Ban of the SRP) BVerfGE 2, 1 at 40. 
102
 Ibid at 41ff. 
103
 Klaus Stern (note 92 above) at 334; Theodor Maunz ‘Art. 21’ in Theodor Maunz and Günter Dürig 
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104
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 Klaus Stern (note 92 above) at 335. 
108
 Jörn Ipsen (note 48 above) at para 58. 
 19 
power is limited in time.
109
 Therefore, elections must take place again after a certain 
period of time has elapsed.    
 
Finally, article 21 of the Basic Law requires political parties to comply with the 
principle of majority rule.
110
 This principle is rooted in the notion that elections must 
be held on the basis of equal suffrage to be considered democratic.
111
      
 
To summarise, the FFC and most of the scholars have so far interpreted article 21 of 
the Basic Law as a minimum threshold. Unsurprisingly, article 21 of the Basic Law 
therefore contains quite exactly does feature which were identified above as basic 
principles of the notion of internal party democracy.
112
 To put it differently, article 
21 of the Basic Law establishes rather a ‘floor’ of internal party democracy than a 
‘roof`’. By the same token, the Basic Law recognises that in the context of internal 
party democracy one should strike an appropriate balance between, on the one hand, 
ensuring to a certain extent active participation of the party members in the activities 
of a political party and, on the other hand, providing enough room for political 
parties to preserve their internal unity and autonomy from the government.     
 
(ii) Implementation of article 21 (1) of the Basic Law into Federal Laws 
 
The abovementioned rather broad requirements set out by the Basic Law in article 21 
certainly need further clarification. Therefore, article 21 (3) of the Basic Law itself 
states: 
 
‘Details shall be regulated by federal laws.’   
 
Interestingly enough, it took the German parliament nearly 20 years – the PPA was 
only promulgated in 1967 – to fulfil this constitutional obligation. The reasons for 
that delay were twofold. First, the delay can be explained by the unwillingness of the 
political parties to submit themselves to rules and therefore limit their own freedom 
                                                 
109
 Ibid at para 59. 
110




 See chapter II (3). 
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of internal decision making.
113
 Secondly, the political parties could not come to an 
agreement on the regulation of public subsidies which at this time was a major 
source of income of political parties.
114
 In the end, it was a decision of the FCC in 
1966
115
 that banned direct public funding of political parties and therefore indirectly 
forced political parties to pass a comprehensive party law.
116
 It is especially this 
party law – the PPA, which I will examine in the following paragraphs – that 
specified the content of internal party democracy in terms of article 21 of the Basic 
Law. 
 
The PPA is a quite comprehensive law and regulates, like article 21 of the Basic 
Law, far more than the internal organisation of political parties.
117
 For the purpose of 
this paper, I will however focus on those provisions that concern internal party 
democracy. 
    
As already mentioned above, according to article 21 of the Basic Law one 
cornerstone of internal party democracy is that political parties must be organised 
‘from the bottom to the top’. This idea is especially reflected by article 7, 8 and 9 of 
the PPA. Article 8 (1) of the PPA inter alia states that ‘[t]he assembly of members 
and the Executive Committee are indispensable bodies of a political party and its 
regional/local branches. The statutes may stipulate that in supra-local branches, the 
members’ assembly may be replaced by a delegates’ assembly whose members shall 
be elected, for a maximum of two years, by the members’ or delegates’ assemblies of 
the subordinate branches.’ Furthermore, article 9 (1) of the PPA inter alia reads: 
‘[t]he assembly of members or delegates … is the supreme body of the respective 
regional/local branch. It is called a “party convention” in the case of higher-level 
branches, and a "general assembly" at the lowest level.’ The assembly or more 
precisely the assemblies of members or delegates must therefore be the major forums 
in every political party. Certainly, those who are in favour of the idea of direct 
                                                 
113
 Heinrich Oberreuter ‘Politische Parteien: Stellung und System im Verfassungssystem der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland’ in Alf Mintzel and Heinrich Oberreuter (eds) Parteien in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1992) 32.    
114
 Heino Kaack Geschichte und Struktur des deutschen Parteiensystems (1971) 367. 
115
 Judgement of the FCC Parteienfinanzierung I (public funding of political parties I) BVerfGE 20, 
56. 
116
 Thomas Poguntke ‘Parties in a Legalistic Culture: The Case of Germany’ in Richard Katz and 
Peter Mair (eds) How Parties Organize (1994) 189f.  
117
 It also covers, for instance, detailed regulations about public financing; see articles 18ff of the 
PPA.    
 21 
democracy in political parties may refuse to accept delegates’ assemblies. Yet, as 
already mentioned above, the Basic Law is not underpinned by only one specific 
theory of democracy. This concept is also reflected by the PPA which allows 
delegates’ assemblies. Moreover, the legitimacy of assemblies of delegates can also 
be explained by practical reasons. It is simply very difficult for political parties to act 
effectively without assemblies of delegates considering the fact that, for instance, the 
SPD nearly has 500,000 members.
118
  However, the possibility to establish 
assemblies of delegates in the end means that the members of a political party 
directly participate in the action of the party only at the lowest organisational level, 
namely the subdivisions of the respective regional/local branches.
119
 Therefore, the 
regional/local branches in particular at the lowest level are the places where the 
members mainly exercise their right to participate. It is against this background that 
the regional/local branches should not be oversized as effective participation, which 
is a necessary precondition according to article 21 of the Basic Law, can only take 
place in a forum in which any party member is actually able to contribute in debating 
and decision-making.
120
 Article 7 (1) of the PPA therefore states: ‘[p]olitical parties 
shall be organised in regional and/or local branches. The size and level of 
regional/local branches shall be laid down in the party’s statutes. Such territorial 
subdivisions must be developed to a sufficient degree to enable individual members 
to participate, on an adequate scale, in the party’s policy and decision-making 
processes.’ 
 
To sum up, according to the PPA the members are the foundation of the political 
party. Above this foundation, political parties are allowed to establish a rather 
complex organisational structure of higher- and lower-level regional/local branches. 
Every regional/local branch needs to have a members’ assembly or a delegates’ 
assembly in which the members of the political party are represented.   
 
The members’ assemblies or delegates’ assemblies undertake essential tasks. They 
decide on ‘party policies, the statutes, rules on membership dues, rules on arbitration 
                                                 
118
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procedures, the party’s dissolution and its merger with other parties.’
121
 Furthermore, 
they elect the leadership of the party, namely ‘the chairperson of the regional/local 
branch, his/her deputies, the other members of the Executive Committee and the 
members of any other bodies.’
122
 Additionally, and equally important, the members’ 
assemblies elect the ‘delegates … to the bodies of higher-level regional branches.’
123
 
As already mentioned above, in order to guarantee freedom of speech, it is also 
important that the party members or their representatives have the right to make 
proposals regarding, for instance, the nomination or recalling of the leadership. This 
right is fleshed out in a quite general fashion by the PPA in article 15 (3) which inter 
alia states: ‘[t]he right to propose motions shall be designed in such a way as to 
ensure democratic policy formation and decision-making processes, and, in 
particular, adequate discussion also of the proposals submitted by minorities.’ 
Finally, the PPA also embraces the essential principles of a democratic election. The 
principle of majority rule can be found in article 15 (1) of the PPA,
124
 the principle of 
secret voting in article 15 (2),
125
 and the principles of free and regular elections is 
implied by articles 8 (1), 11 (1) and 15 (3).
126
       
 
So far the PPA sets out a quite detailed legal framework which is supposed to 
guarantee the core values of internal party democracy. However, there are, in my 
view, two provisions of the PPA that must be considered problematic from a 
democratic point of view.
127
 It is the legitimacy of ex-officio memberships in the 
delegates’ assemblies and the Executive Committees. Ex-officio members are 
members of a body who are part of it by virtue of holding another office.
128
 Article 9 
(2) of the PPA states:  
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123
 Article 9 (4) of the PPA. 
124
 Article 9 (1) of the PPA reads: ‘The party’s bodies shall adopt their resolutions by a simple 
majority vote unless a higher majority is prescribed by law or by the party statutes.’   
125
 According to article 15 (2) of the PPA this principle, however, only covers the ‘[e]lections of the 
members of the Executive Committee and of the delegates to delegates’ assemblies and to bodies of 
higher-level regional branches.’  
126
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128
 Wolfgang Rudzio Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2011) 145. 
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‘Members of the Executive Committee, members of other bodies of the regional/local branch 
and any persons as defined in Section 11 para. 2 may, pursuant to the statutes, be members 
of a delegates’ assembly, but in this case the number of those who are entitled to vote must 
not exceed one-fifth of the total number of assembly members as provided under the statutes.’ 
 
 
Furthermore, article 11 (2) of the PPA inter alia reads: 
 
‘The Executive Committee may, pursuant to the statutes, include members of parliament and 
other high-ranking persons in the party if they hold an office or a mandate as a result of an 




These provisions, which have not yet been subject to a constitutional challenge 
before the FCC, can be considered as an ‘historic remains’ of the time before the 
PPA was enacted. In that time, following the end of the Second World War, it was 
generally accepted, even though already constitutionally problematic, that great 
numbers of ex-officio members were part of the assemblies and the Executive 
Committees of political parties with the result that the number of ex-officio members 
often exceeded the number of elected members in these bodies.
129
 Although, 
according to the PPA, the number of ex-officio members is now limited to 20 per 
cent of the total membership of the delegates’ assemblies and the Executive 
Committees respectively, it is still a remarkable number given the fact that article 21 
of the Basic Law clearly obligates political parties to organise in a democratic 
manner. Indeed, these ex-officio members are democratically problematic because 
they are simply not elected into the respective delegates’ assembly or the Executive 
Committee by the members of the political party. While it may be true that ex-officio 
members have a sort of democratic legitimacy as they were someday elected to hold 
another office, they are, however, not elected into the respective delegates’ assembly 
or Executive Committee. Therefore, the model of ex-officio memberships in terms of 
article 9 (2) and 11 (2) of the PPA does not allow the members of political parties to 
decide who should represent their interest in the respective bodies. Furthermore, it is 
more difficult to hold ex-officio members accountable as they cannot be recalled 
directly but only indirectly by the members. 
 
As already mentioned above, the PPA is not the only Federal Law that regulates 
internal party democracy in Germany. In particular concerning the nomination of 
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candidates for elections to parliaments the PPA does not contain detailed provisions. 
It is only article 17 of the PPA which states: 
  
‘Nomination of candidates for elections to parliaments must be by secret ballot. The 




The main electoral law in Germany is the Federal Elections Act (FEA) which, 
indeed, comprises specific rules regarding the selection process of those who will be 
the party’s candidates in the upcoming national election. These rules can be found in 
particular in article 21 of the FEA. According to article 21 (1) of the FEA ‘[a] person 
may only be named as a candidate of a party in a constituency nomination if he or 
she is not a member of another party and has been elected for this purpose at a 
members' assembly convened to elect a constituency candidate or at a special or 
general delegates' assembly.’
130
 Furthermore, the FEA obligates political parties to 
accept proposals regarding candidates from every person who attends the assembly 
and to give every aspiring candidate the opportunity to present his or her political 
program.
131
 With regard to the electoral system in Germany,
132
 article 27 (5) of the 
FPA ensures that the principles set out in article 21 of the FPA does not only apply to 
the election of constituency candidates but also to the election of those who seek to 
get a place on the party’s electoral list. Concerning the latter point, the party 
members or their representatives also determine the order of the candidates on the 
list.
133
         
 
At the end of this subsection, it seems to be important to highlight – besides the 
already mentioned ex-officio members – another instance of lack of internal party 
democracy within the described legal framework. It involves the German Chancellor 
or more precisely the selection of the candidate for Chancellor of the respective 
political party. 
 
                                                 
130
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It follows from the forgoing subsections that all members of the Executive 
Committee of a political party (the leadership) as well as all candidates for elections 
to parliament must be elected democratically. However, neither the PPA nor the FEA 
requires the candidate for Chancellor of the respective political party to be a member 
of the Executive Committee or a candidate for the elections to parliament.
134
 
Furthermore, the PPA and the FEA do not require political parties to select their 
candidate for Chancellor democratically. Indeed, neither the PPA nor the FEA 
contain any provision regarding the candidate for Chancellor of political parties. In 
other words, there is no national legislation in place governing the selection of the 
candidate for Chancellor. 
 
This can be explained by historic developments.
135
 It has been and actually is still 
quite usual in Germany that the candidate for Chancellor is also the democratically 
elected Executive Chairman of the respective political party.
136
 Therefore, when the 
PPA was enacted it was not considered necessary to include specific provisions 
regarding the candidate for Chancellor.
137
 In the course of time some parties have, 
however, decided to split the post of the candidate for Chancellor and the Executive 
Chairman into two separate positions
138





As already mentioned above, it is very likely that the candidate for Chancellor of 
either the SPD or CDU becomes the German Chancellor after the general elections. 
Given this importance of the candidate for Chancellor and taking into account the 
abovementioned principles underlying article 21 of the Basic Law, it seems to be 
democratically and constitutionally problematic that neither the PPA nor the FEA 
contain rules that govern the selection procedure of the candidate for Chancellor. 
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(c) The constitutions of the SPD and CDU 
 
The enactment of the PPA in 1967 led to the most extensive reforms regarding the 
constitutions of political parties since the end of the Second World War.
140
 The 
reasons for that were as follows: First, the PPA (read with the FEA) set out a quite 
detailed legal framework which basically does not leave much room for manoeuvre 
for political parties in Germany with regard to the core values of internal party 
democracy. Secondly, until 1967 political parties tended to interpret their 
constitutional obligation to organise democratically rather widely. This was also 
reflected by their constitutions whose content needed to be considered 




Given today’s dense legal framework, it seems not surprising that the constitutions of 
political parties exactly reflect the abovementioned content of the PPA and the FEA 
nowadays.
142
 Furthermore, because of the quite detailed regulation of internal party 
democracy, the internal structure of political parties in Germany is basically similar 
nowadays.
143
 Therefore, I will at this point not examine the constitution of the SPD 
and CDU in great detail in that regard as it would only be a repetition of the 
foregoing paragraphs. However, it might nevertheless be interesting to have a brief 
look at the constitution of the SPD and the CDU in order to see how in particular the 
democratically problematic ex-officio memberships and selection of the candidate 
for Chancellor are being handled. I will focus in this regard on the highest level of 
the organisational structure of the SPD and CDU.  
 
(i) Ex-officio members 
 
The way the CDU and SPD deal with ex-officio members within their delegates’ 
assemblies and the Executive Committees is indeed quite similar. As already 
mentioned above, the PPA allows in each of these bodies a number of ex-officio 
members up to 20 per cent of the total membership of the respective body. With 
regard to the delegates’ assembly of the SPD, the 20 per cent scope is, however, by 
                                                 
140




 See Ursula Heinz Organisation innerparteilicher Willensbildung: Satzungen und innerparteiliche 
Demokratie (1987).  
143
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far not exploited. According to article 15 read with article 23 of the constitution of 
the SPD,
144
 the delegates’ assembly at the highest level contains 600 members of 
whom a maximum of 35 members are allowed to be ex-officio members. This is 
approximately equivalent to 5 per cent.
145
 Similarly, the CDU does not take full 
advantage of the scope given by the PPA either. According to article 28 of the CDU 
constitution,
146
 the delegates’ assembly at the highest level consists of (around) 1000 
members of whom only the honorary chairs and the delegates of the ‘overseas 
branches’ must not be elected by the delegates’ assemblies of the lower-level 
branches.
147
 The number of ex-officio members is therefore normally well below the 




A similar picture emerges when it comes to the Executive Committees. Each 
members of the SPD Executive Committee must be elected democratically by the 
delegates’ assembly according to article 23(3) of the SPD constitution.
149
 There are 
no exceptions provided by the SPD constitution and therefore no ex-officio member 
is to be found in the SPD Executive Committee. In contrast to that, the number of ex-
officio members in the CDU Executive Committee can vary from approximately 5 
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Therefore, although the PPA contains a loophole with regard to internal party 
democracy (the ex-officio memberships), the SPD and the CDU have not fully 
exploited it yet. The difference between the SPD (0 per cent) and CDU (5 to 15 per 
cent) regarding the number of ex officio members in the Executive Committee can in 
fact again be explained by the history of these political parties. Unlike the CDU, the 
SPD as a ‘Workers’ Party’ has ever been in favour of grassroots democracy which is 
why the SPD’s Executive Committee even prior the enactment of the PPA fully 
consisted of elected members.
151
           
 
(ii) Selection of the candidate for Chancellor  
 
As already mentioned above, the selection of the candidate for Chancellor is neither 
regulated by the PPA nor the FEA. Unlike the ex-officio memberships, this legal 
loophole has, in my view, been large exploited by the CDU and to a lesser extent by 
SPD. In fact, both political parties have no clear rules in place that govern the 




The CDU has several times attempted to amend its constitution in order to regulate 
the selection process and to grant the delegates’ assembly the right to make proposals 
and to elect the candidate for Chancellor.
153
 All these attempts have however been 
unsuccessful so far.
154
 Therefore, the question who has the formal competence for 
the selection of the candidate for Chancellor is still an unsolved one. For pragmatic 
reasons an unrivalled CDU candidate for Chancellor is however usually selected by 
the Executive Committee.
155
 This selection procedure must however be considered 
nontransparent as it is not clear how the Executive Committee arrives at the result.
156
 
Sometimes, but not always, the selected candidate then gets approved by the 
delegates’ assembly.
157
 Although the delegates’ assembly could therefore 
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theoretically vote against the proposed candidate, the ‘election’ of the candidate by 
the delegates’ assembly must indeed be named a mere rubber-stamping exercise for 
the following reason.
158
 The election of the candidate for Chancellor normally takes 
place just a few months before the general election.
159
 Hence, the delegates are under 
the pressure of showing unity within the party by accepting the proposed candidate 
with an overwhelming majority. It is against this background that a proposed 
candidate for Chancellor has never been rejected by the delegates’ assembly and 
always receives a large number of votes (more than 90 per cent).
160
 All in all, it could 
thus be said that selection procedure within the CDU is rather determined by internal 
and secret tactical manoeuvring in a context of power and policy struggles than by 
democratic principles.
161
   
 
The selection process of the SPD candidate for chancellor is not governed by clear 
rules either. By contrast to the CDU, the SPD however amended its constitution in 
1993 to allow the party members to nominate the SPD candidate for chancellor 
through a ballot vote.
162
 Article 13 (1) of the SPD constitution inter alia reads: ‘the 
candidate for chancellor may be determined through ballot vote.’ However, article 
13 (1) clearly says ‘may’ and not ‘must’ by which other selection procedures are not 
excluded. In fact, the SPD candidate for Chancellor has yet not been directly elected 
by the members through ballot vote.
163
 One reason for this is the fairly high barrier 
for party members to initiate a ballot vote
164
 which makes it actually impossible for 
the party members to exercise their rights in this regard.
165
 Therefore and similar to 
the CDU, the SPD candidate for chancellor is usually nominated by the SPD’s 
Executive Committee through a nontransparent and secret selection procedure.
166
 
The decision taken by the Executive Committee is normally presented to the 
delegates’ assembly for approval which however, like the delegates’ assembly of the 
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CDU, merely rubber-stamp the decision taken by the Executive Committee of the 
SPD.
167
              
 
The selection procedure of the candidate for chancellor of both the SPD and CDU 
must be considered constitutionally and democratically problematic. Although the 
delegates’ assembly is sometimes somehow involved in the procedures, the selection 
process is basically dominated by the party-elite. Unlike the selection process of, for 
instance, the parties’ Executive Committees, the party members or their 
representatives actually do not have a real and fair opportunity to participate in the 
nomination process of the candidate for Chancellor as they are, for instance, in fact 
not able to propose a candidate. Furthermore, evidence for the lack of internal party 
democracy regarding the selection procedure of the candidate for Chancellor can also 
be seen in the mere fact that there has never been public campaigning of different 
aspiring candidates for chancellor within a German political party.
168
 This is a 
practice that is, for instance, well known by the United States presidential 
primaries.
169
    
 
(d) Enforcing internal party democracy 
 
It goes without saying that it is more likely that a legal framework is effective when 
its provisions are actually enforceable. Of course the same applies to a legal 
framework that governs internal party democracy.
170
 In the following paragraphs I 
will therefore have a brief look at the legal consequences resulting from a breach of 




 an infringement of article 21 (1) of the Basic Law can basically be 
caused by both a provision of a party’s constitution or a decision taken by a political 
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 Such an infringement leads to the invalidity of the provision or the decision 
respectively.
173
 An application for a declaration of invalidity can be made to a court 




However, a breach of article 21 (1) of the Basic Law can even have more serious 
consequences. According to the case-law of the FCC, an infringement of the 
constitutional precepts of democracy by a political party may constitute an election 
error
175
 which in turn may affect the validity of the general elections.
176
 Admittedly, 
it is rather unlikely that the FCC declares general elections invalid because of the big 
effect such a decision would have. Indeed, the FCC has so far never declared a 
general election invalid although (minor) infringements of the constitutional precepts 
of democracy have been found by the FCC. In, for instance, the case named 
candidate selection (Kandidatenaufstellung)
177
 the FCC held that the limitation of 
the speaking time of an aspiring candidate for a place on the electoral list to three 
minutes constitutes a failure to satisfy the constitutional precepts of internal party 
democracy and therefore manifests an electoral error.
178
 However, the court further 
held that in the circumstances of this case – the aspiring candidate eventually 
received only 2,1 per cent of the votes of the delegates – it cannot be assumed that a 
longer speaking time would have significantly changed his election result. Therefore, 
it can also not be assumed that a longer speaking time would have changed the result 




Furthermore, a violation of the article 21 (1) of the Basic Law can even result in 
banning a political party. Article 21 (2) of the Basic Law states:  
 
‘Parties that, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their adherents, seek to undermine 
or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule 
on the question of unconstitutionality.’  
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Although article 21 (2) of the Basic law does not expressly name the internal 
structure of a political party as ground of a party-ban, in the Ban of the Socialist 
Reich Party case (SRP-Verbot) the FCC linked the obligation of political parties to 
organise democratically with article 21 (2) of the Basic Law. The Court held: 
 
‘If a party's internal organisation does not  correspond  to  democratic  principles,  one  may  
generally  conclude  that  the  party  seeks  to impose upon the state the structural principles 
that it has implemented  within its own  organisation.’
180 
     
The FCC eventually banned the Socialist Reich Party as the party was structured 
from the top to the bottom in a dictatorial manner which, according to the FCC, 
indicated that the aim of the Socialist Reich Party was to impose these structural 
principles upon the state.
181
 Although one should not place too much emphasis on 
this case as the Social Reich Party described itself as successor of the fascist NSDAP 
which is why the case was a very sensitive issue in post-war Germany of 1952, the 
FCC showed that it is willing to enforce internal party democracy and even does not 
shrink back from dissolving a political party that does not comply with their 
constitutional obligation to organise democratically. Generally, such as massive 
intervention as dissolving a political party due to its undemocratic structure will 
however remain very exceptional.
182
        
 
Summarising the above, in the most instances a violation of article 21 (1) of the 
Basic Law will ‘only’ cause the invalidity of the relevant provision of the party’s 
constitution or the affected decision. The other described measures have been and 
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 Bodo Pieroth ‘Art. 21’ in Hans Jarass and Bodo Pieroth Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (2005) para 26. 
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IV SOUTH AFRICA 
 
In contrast to Germany, South Africa does not provide a comprehensive and uniform 
legal framework that governs internal party democracy. Or to put it differently, there 
is no party law in place aiming to regulate the internal structure of political parties 
and the degree to which party member’s can exercise their right to participate within 
a political party. One may therefore conclude that political parties in South Africa are 
lacking internal party democracy. However, despite a missing comprehensive party 
law, a closer look perhaps reveals that isolated rules within the South African legal 
system exist which could at least have an effect on the internal life of political 
parties. Furthermore, the lack of a party law does of course not mean that political 
parties in South Africa are not allowed to voluntarily apply democratic standards 
internally. In this chapter I will therefore – similarly to the foregoing chapter –
examine some external provisions which may impact on internal party democracy, 
and I will check the content of internal rules of political parties which may also 
govern internal party democracy. Regarding the latter I will focus on the 
constitutions of the ANC and the DA. In the last part of this chapter I will briefly 
discuss a possible approach towards the adoption of a party law in South Africa.                 
 
(a) The role of political parties in South Africa 
 
As already noted in the foregoing chapter about Germany, it is simply not possible to 
talk about political parties without mentioning the country-specific setting they are 
acting in. For that reason I will at this point just briefly portray the role and 




As accurately pointed out by the South African Constitutional Court in Ramakatsa 
and Others v Magashule and Others, in the South African ‘system of democracy 
political parties occupy the centre stage and play a vital part in facilitating the 
exercise of political rights.’
184
 This important role of political parties is indeed 
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underlined by many provisions of the South African Constitution.
185
 These 
provisions mainly cover political parties with regard to their operation within elected 
institutions and, generally speaking, are based on the assumption that representative 
democracy in South Africa is ought to be stimulated primarily through them.
186
 
Accordingly, it is no wonder that even the significant section 1 of the Constitution 
states that South Africa is – among others things – founded on the values of 
‘[u]niversal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a 





The concept of multi-party democracy is also reflected by the South African electoral 
system. Unlike the German mixed-member proportional representation system, in 
South Africa the members of the National Assembly and the provincial legislatures 
are elected through using a system of pure proportional representation.
188
 This means 
that citizens do not vote for individual candidates at all – for instance in a 
constituency – but only for political parties.
189
 The voters can therefore only 
determine the distribution of seats in the National Assembly or the provincial 
legislatures, but they can not influence with their vote which persons will actually sit 
in parliament. This is decided by the respective political party.
190
 As far as the 
electoral system is concerned, it can therefore be said that the role which political 
parties play in South African is even more important than in Germany as the 
electoral system is purely party-based.    
 
The essential role which political parties play in South Africa is also present by a 
look at the process through which the President gets elected. Similar to the situation 
of the Chancellor in Germany, the South African President, which however in 
contrast to Germany is the head of government and the head of state,
191
 is elected by 
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 This means that the citizens do not directly vote in the 
general election for a presidential candidate. The electoral rather indirectly indicate 
with their vote for a political party that they prefer the leader of the respective 
political party to become the President.
193
    
 
Finally, the high level of party discipline in South Africa needs to be noted.
194
 The 
constitution of the DA, for example, states that ‘[m]embers [of a legislative caucus] 
must at all times adhere to and support the decisions of the relevant caucus and most 
not differ publicly from any decision once it has been taken except when it has been 
decided by the caucus that a member may on a question of conscience exercise a free 
vote.’
195
 Further, section 2.5.3.1 of the DA constitution reads: ‘[a]ny member, 
including a public representative, is guilty of misconduct if he or she … publicly   
opposes   the   Party’s   principles   or   repeatedly opposes published party policies,  
except in or through the appropriate Party structures.’ In this context it is important 
to highlight that an infringement of these internal party rules can have an external 
effect as section 47(3)(c) of the Constitution states that a Member of Parliament loses 
its membership if he or she ‘ceases to be member of the party that nominated that 
person as a member of the Assembly.’ The party discipline in South Africa, which is 
reflected by these quoted provisions, therefore makes it often difficult for Members 
of Parliament to freely follow their consciences when voting.
196
 In the same breath, it 
places political parties rather than the individual Member of Parliament at the centre 
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(b) Are there provisions in South Africa that govern internal party democracy? 
 
In this subchapter I will, first, examine national legislation and regulations to 
determine to what extent they impact on the internal organisation of political parties. 
Secondly, I will consider provisions of the constitution in this respect.  
 
(i) National legislation and regulations 
 
In South Africa elections are basically regulated by the Electoral Commission Act 51 
of 1996, the Electoral Act 73 of 1998 and the respective regulations which specify 
these Acts.
197
 This legal framework sets out rules inter alia for the registration of 
political parties and submission of candidate lists.
198
 Both the registration as well as 
the submission of a list of candidates is a requirement for political parties to contest 
elections.
199
 This raises the question whether these rules also lay down requirements 
which impact on the internal structure of political parties. 
 
Sections 15 to 17 of the Electoral Commission Act regulate the registration of 
political parties for the national and provincial elections. According to section 15 of 
the Electoral Commission Act, parties that want to get registered for a election are 
required to provide basic information such as their name or their symbol.
200
 
Furthermore, they – among other things – have to submit their constitution.
201
 
Section 15 of the Electoral Commission Act therefore tells us that political parties 
need to have a constitution to get registered. Section 15 does, however, not make any 
demands on the content of the constitution. It does not prescribe specific 
requirements in terms of the internal organisation of a political party or the degree of 
membership participation which must be met before a party is allowed to 
successfully register. This conclusion is pretty much confirmed by sections 16 and 17 
of the Electoral Commission Act. These sections regulate that political parties whose 
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constitutions inter alia contain anything which, first, ‘portrays the propagation or 
incitement of violence or hatred or which causes serious offence to any section of the 
population on the grounds of race, gender, sex, ethnic origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture or language’ or 
which, secondly, ‘indicates that persons will not be admitted to membership of the 
party or welcomed as supporters of the party on the grounds of their race, ethnic 
origin or colour’ may not get registered or lose their registration respectively.
202
 As 
already mentioned elsewhere in this paper, proportional representation of minorities 
within political parties as well as aspects of gender and race are by some scholars 
considered an element of internal party democracy.
203
 One could also argue that the 
first step to enable participation of, for instance, women within a party is to actually 
admit women without creating discriminatory obstacles. Therefore, one could say 
that sections 16 and 17 of the Electoral Commission Act contain at least one 
requirement that promotes internal party democracy. However, in my view, it then 
has to be admitted that this solitary requirement is fairly useless regarding internal 
party democracy as there are no other rules in place which safeguard and regulate the 
actual degree of membership participation in, for instance, policy making or the 
procedure according to which the leader of a party must be elected. 
 
The Electoral Act inter alia regulates the submission of candidate lists, which is 
necessary to give effect to the proportional representation electoral system. 
According to section 27 of the Electoral Act, a ‘registered party intending to contest 
an election must nominate candidates and submit a list … of those candidates.’ 
Section 27 of the Electoral Act therefore shows that political parties need to produce 
a candidate list. While section 27 of the Electoral Act further compromises 
formalities to be carried out by political parties,
204
 it, however, does not prescribe the 
actual procedure which political parties must follow when nominating their 
candidates. This is left to the discretion of the respective political party. Other 
sections of the Electoral Act do not limit this discretion either. In particular section 
30 of the Electoral Act which set out grounds on which a statement of objection to 
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the nomination of a candidate may be admissible does not contain any rules on 
internal party democracy.  
 
Besides the Electoral Commission Act and Electoral Act, internal party democracy 
could maybe be achieved through the application of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) and in particular by applying the right to procedural 
fairness which is expressly entrenched in sections 3 and 4 of the PAJA in order to 
give effect to section 33(2) of the Constitution. However, there are many difficulties 
to overcome in order to be able to apply the PAJA regarding political parties. Firstly, 
one would have to determine whether the conduct concerned – for instance, the 
appointment of the leader by the Executive Committee of a political party – satisfies 
the requirements of the term ‘administrative action’ in terms of section 1 of the 
PAJA. This would inter alia include determining if political parties ‘exercising a 
public power or performing a public function’.
205
 This would further include stating 
the reasons for the fact that member’s rights or legitimate expectations have been 
materially and adversely affected
206
 and that the conduct concerned has ‘direct, 
external legal effect.’
207
 All these points raise interesting questions. However, to get 
straight to the point, I take the view that the PAJA and the right to procedural 
fairness is – regardless of the answer to those questions – of little help when it comes 
to internal party democracy.
208
 The concept of internal party democracy, as explained 
elsewhere in this paper, is inter alia underlined by the assumption that members of a 
political party are able to substantially influence the outcome of decisions of their 
political party by, for instance, debating and, more importantly, voting. Therefore, 
where internal party democracy is applied and enforced effectively, the members of a 
political party rather than the leadership or an individual must constitute the main 
decision-making body. The decisions taken by the political party are the decisions of 
its members. The members form the centre of power. By contrast, the right to 
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procedural fairness is, according to the PAJA, mainly concerned with giving a person 
inter alia ‘reasonable opportunity to make representations’
209
 or ‘adequate notice of 
the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative action.’
210
 This does, however, 
not mean that the concerned person determines the outcome of the decision. At the 
end it is still the administrator who decides. In an internal party democracy context, 
one, however, does not want the administrator – or to put it differently, the Executive 
Committee – to decide key issues such as who becomes the leader. It is, by contrast, 
the totality of the members who should decide (even if only indirectly). I therefore 
take the view that although the right to procedural fairness as inter alia entrenched in 
the PAJA can in specific circumstances be helpful in terms of internal party 
procedures as, for instance, regarding the exclusion of a party member without first 
giving him or her a hearing,
211
 the right to procedural fairness is, however, not very 
useful when it comes to the protection and enforcement of the above-mentioned core 
values of internal party democracy.  
 
(ii)      The Constitution 
 
By contrast to the German Basic Law, the South African Constitution does not 
provide an express provision that imposes a duty on political parties to handle their 
internal affairs democratically. However, section 19 of the Constitution states: 
 
‘(1) Every citizen is free to make political choices, which includes the right 
(a) to form a political party; 
(b) to participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a political party; and 
(c) to campaign for a political party or cause. 
(2)  Every citizen has the right to free, fair and regular elections for any legislative body 
established in terms of the Constitution. 
(3) Every adult citizen has the right 
(a) to vote in elections for any legislative body established in terms of the 
Constitution, and to do so in secret; and 
(b) to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office.’    
 
From a internal party democracy perspective, in particular section 19(1)(b) of the 
Constitution seems to be of interest. But what does the right to participate in the 
activities of a political party compromise? Which degree of participation is required 
                                                 
209
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210
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by section 19(1)(b) of the Constitution? And does the participation need to be carried 
out democratically? Unfortunately, neither the Constitution nor national legislation 
specify the term participation in this respect. Jason Brickhill and Ryan Babiuch, for 
instance, state that section ‘19(1) does not entitle a person to participate in any 
particular activity of the party of her choice’
212
 which is certainly correct, but does 
not give content to section 19(1)(b) of the Constitution either. However, the 
Constitutional Court’s judgment in Mpho Ramakatsa and other v Elias Magashule 
and Others
213
 may give a little guidance in this regard. 
 
This case was concerned with irregularities which occurred in general meetings of 
ANC branches in January and February 2012. At those meetings the branches had 
elected delegates to the Free State Provincial Conference of the ANC. In June 2012 
this Provincial Conference eventually adopted several policies and elected the Free 
State Provincial Executive Committee of the ANC. Against this background, the 
appellants, ‘six members of the ANC in the Free State, sought an order setting aside 
the Provincial Conference … including all decisions and resolutions taken during the 
Conference.’
214
 Moseneke DCJ and Jafta J, writing for the majority, held that the 
irregularities proved by the appellants infringed the constitution of the ANC
215
 and 
the appellants’ right to participate in the activities of the ANC.
216
 Accordingly, the 




Concerning the interpretation of section 19(1) of the Constitution, the Court, first of 
all, spoke about the historical context against which this section is need to be 
interpreted.
218
 The Court emphasised that during apartheid only the minority of the 
people were allowed to exercise political rights and that organisations which 
campaigned for equal rights for black people were banned. People who participated 
in these organisations exposed themselves to serious danger. Preventing ‘this 
wholesale denial of political rights to citizens of the country from ever happening 
again’ is therefore, according to the Court, the purpose of section 19 of the 
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 Moreover, the Court underlined the important role that political 
parties play in today’s constitutional democracy on several paragraphs.
220
 Having 
said that the Court held: 
 
‘In relevant part section 19(1) proclaims that every citizen of our country is free to make 
political choices which include the right to participate in the activities of a political party. 
This right is conferred in unqualified terms. Consistent with the generous reading of 
provisions of this kind, the section means what it says and says what it means. It guarantees 
freedom to make political choices and once a choice on a political party is made, the section 
safeguards a member’s participation in the activities of the party concerned. In this case the 
appellants and other members of the ANC enjoy a constitutional guarantee that entitles them 
to participate in its activities. It protects the exercise of the right not only against external 
interference but also against interference arising from within the party.’
221
   
         
The Court then continued saying that the way party member’s can participate in the 
activities of a political parties is not regulated by the Constitution as this regards 
‘internal matters of each political party.’
222
 Political parties are ‘best placed to 
determine how members would participate in internal activities.’
223
 In the same 
breath, however, the Court stressed that constitutions of political parties may not be 
‘inconsistent with section 19.’
224
 The court therefore implied that, one the one hand, 
political parties should be given sufficient room to regulate their internal affairs, but, 
on the other hand, the Constitution requires at least a minimum of participation. The 
tension between these interests is characteristic for the issue of internal party 
democracy since political parties, as explained elsewhere in this paper, are creatures 
who somehow act on the border between the public and private sphere. 
Unfortunately, the Court did not tell us more about the content of section 19(1)(b) as 
the ‘validity of the ANC’s Constitution was not under attack.’
225
 But, as Pierre de 
Vos has pointed out, although the Court never expressly defined the content of 
section 19(1)(b) of the Constitution in Ramakatsa, the judgment slightly indicates 
what may, inter alia, compromise the right to participate in the activities of a 
political party as the Court discussed some provisions of the ANC’s constitution in 
this regard.
226
 Among those provisions were: the power of the members ‘to 
determine and formulate the party’s policies’; accountability of the leadership; 
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 Pierre de Vos (note 29 above) at 21. 
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‘freedom of speech’; ‘circulation of ideas and information’; ‘active participation in 
the discussion, formulation and implementation’ of policies and taking ‘part in the 
elections’ and getting ‘elected or appointed’.
227
 I will discuss some of these quoted 
provisions of the ANC constitution in more detail in the next subchapter. However, it 
can already be said that these provisions point to a fairly decent degree of active 




Besides these indicators, the court emphasised in Ramakatsa the strong link between 
the right to vote and section 19(1)(b) of the Constitution
229
 by saying that section 19 
needs to be interpreted in the light of the right to vote. From a perspective of 
participatory democracy, this link also indicates that member’s participation in the 
activities of a political party may not be neglected. In order to accentuate this point 
Moseneke DCJ and Jafta J quoted August and Another v Electoral Commission and 
Others
230
 in which Sachs J inter alia stated:  
 
‘Universal adult suffrage on a common voters roll is one of the foundational values of our 
entire constitutional order. The achievement of the franchise has historically been important 
both for the acquisition of the rights of full and effective citizenship by all South Africans 
regardless of race, and for the accomplishment of an all-embracing nationhood. The 
universality of the franchise is important not only for nationhood and democracy. The vote of 
each and every citizen is a badge of dignity and of personhood. Quite literally, it says that 
everybody counts. In a country of great disparities of wealth and power it declares that 
whoever we are, whether rich or poor, exalted or disgraced, we all belong to the same 
democratic South African nation; that our destinies are intertwined in a single interactive 
polity. Rights may not be limited without justification and legislation dealing with the 




    
As already mentioned, the Constitutional Court did not at any time in Ramakatsa 
expressly define the content of section 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. However, one 
could argue that the Court used many indicator to emphasis the importance of section 
19(1)(b) which in turn points to the necessary degree of participation that is required 
by this section. To sum up, the Court in particular stressed the historical context of 
section 19, the pivotal role of political parties for the South African democracy and 
finally the right to vote. In my view, all these indicators suggest that the right to 
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participate in the activities of a political party must be carried out in a democratic 
manner.
232
 Or to put it differently, at least the core values of internal party 
democracy, which I have mentioned elsewhere in this paper, represent the minimum 
which is required by section 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
 
It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It 
is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It is. It  
 
(c) The constitutions of the ANC and DA 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the lack of express (state) 
provisions which govern internal party democracy does not hinder political parties 
from organising democratically. This is all the more true since some scholars have 
suggested that forms of internal party democracy are desirable for political as they 
may foster party unity and prevent the fragmentation of political parties.
233
 




 As in the 
previous chapters, I will mainly focus on the basic requirements of internal party 
democracy.   
 
 – The ANC – 
As the ANC’s total membership is approximately 1.2 million,
236
 the organisational 
structure of the ANC seems to be crucial to guarantee democratic participation of all 
members. Given the very high number of members of the ANC, it is not surprising 
that the ANC, first, divided its structure into different levels
237
 and, secondly, applies 
a delegates system.
238
 The organisational structure of the ANC is therefore pretty 
much the same as the structure of German political parties. On each level – branch, 
regional, provincial and national
239
 – regular meetings of the members must take 
place.
240
 These meetings, which are called general meetings at branch level and 
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conferences at the other levels,
241
 are supposed to be the main decision-making 
bodies through which inter alia delegates of the branches are elected to the 
conferences at the higher levels.
242
 Therefore, like in the CDU and the SPD, the 
members of the ANC exercise their right to participate mainly at the lowest level, the 
branch level. The constitution of the ANC recognises this by stating that ‘the branch 
shall be the place where members exercise their basic democratic rights to discuss 
and formulate policy and be the basic unit of activity for members.’
243
 On each level 
there is also an Executive Committee which gets elected by the respective conference 
at regular intervals.
244
 But how exactly gets the leadership elected? How does the 
ANC produce its candidate list for the national elections? Which role do the 
members play in policy development? On the next paragraphs I will tackle these 
issues.
245
 I will mainly focus on the national level of the ANC in this respect.   
  
The vast majority of the members of the National Executive Committee (NEC), 
which is the most important body of the ANC between National Conferences
246
 and 
compromises all important persons of the ANC such as the President or the National 
Chairperson,  gets elected by the National Conference through secret ballot every 
five years.
247
 Candidates for an office in the NEC are generally proposed by the 
provinces. Yet, delegates of the National Conference may also make proposals.
248
 
From an internal party democracy point of view, a problem that arises in this respect 
is, however, the composition of the National Conference. According to rule 10.1.1 of 
the ANC Constitution, ‘at least 90% of the delegates shall be from branches, from 
properly constituted branch general meetings’. These delegates need to get elected 
democratically.
249
 However, what about the remaining 10 per cent? These seats are 
issued to ex-officio members and to persons from the ‘Leagues’ which get selected 
by the NEC.
250
 This procedure must be considered democratically problematic. As 
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already mentioned in the chapter about Germany, ex-officio members are simply not 
democratically authorised by the members of the political party to hold the 
concerned office. The same applies to the persons from the ‘Leagues’ who get 
appointed by the NEC. Interestingly, however, the German PPA, as described 
elsewhere in this paper, allows the delegates’ assemblies to compromise even 20 per 
cent ex-officio members. In this context a further problem is that not all members of 
the NEC, even though the vast majority, are elected by the National Conference. 
Indeed, according to the constitution of the ANC, around 20 per cent of the NEC’s 




The process of nominating candidates in order to produce a candidate list for the 
national elections is of paramount importance given the South African electoral 
system of pure proportional representation. The ANC’s constitution is, however, 
fairly silent on the nomination process. Rule 12.2.11 of the constitution only states 
that the NEC ‘appoints annually a National List Committee of not fewer than 5 (five) 
and not more than 9 (nine) persons for the selection and adoption of candidates for 
Parliament. (The NEC shall draw up regulations for the procedures to be followed in 
such a selection. The National List Committee shall report to the NEC prior to the 
implementation of its recommendations.’ Yet, a look at the ‘List Process Guidelines 
2013 as adopted by the NEC’
252
 reveals that the nomination process is fairly complex 
and takes a long time because all branches of the ANC participate in it. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to explain the entire process in detail. However, from an 
internal party democracy perspective, the role of the NEC in the nomination 
procedures must be considered problematic. This is because the nomination process 
as such could be considered in line with democratic standards if the NEC had not the 
authority to significantly change the list of candidates according to the ‘List Process 
Guidelines’. For instance, rule 19 of the Guidelines states that ‘[t]he NEC shall have 
the power to allocate up to 20 seats in order to ensure that there is requisite skills and 
expertise deployed to the national legislature.’ More importantly, however, rule 20 
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gives the NEC actually unlimited power to modify the list. It inter alia reads: ‘All 
powers and final discussions about lists, quotas and ordering lies with the NEC’. It is 
therefore not surprising that the Guidelines itself admit that the applied process 
‘combines democratic and political intervention’ which ‘might mean that a few 
people who were selected in terms of the democratic process might not be included 




The constitution of the ANC safeguards the right of the members to participate in 
policy formulation in various rules.
254
 For instance, under the heading ‘the character 
of the ANC’ rule 3.2 of the constitution says that ‘policies are determined by the 
membership’, and rule 3.7 of the constitution guarantees ‘freedom of speech’ which 
is essential in particular with regard to policy development. Furthermore, according 
to the constitution of the ANC, the branches are supposed to be the place where the 
members discuss and formulate policies.
255
 But, who has the final say about the 
policies of the ANC? It is basically the delegates’ assembly at the highest level, the 
National Conference.
256
 However, as the National Conference does of course not 
meet every day, it seems to be a practical necessity that NEC has also the authority to 
specify policies in certain cases. Rule 12.2.9 of the ANC’s constitution therefore 
states that the NEC has the power ‘to issue … policy directive as when it deems fit.’ 
Yet, it should go without saying that the NEC should not make use of this power in 
key issues and should, moreover, not adopt entirely new policies without the 
approval of the National Conference.                 
     
– The DA – 
Although the DA has neither as many members as the ANC
257
 nor the same 
history,
258
 on paper its basic organisational structure is comparable to the ANC’s. 
The DA’s structures are also divided into different levels – namely: federal, 
provincial, regional, constituency and local (branch) level
259
 –, and the DA uses a 
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delegates system at the higher levels.
260
 The branches are therefore also the place 
where the DA’s members mainly exercise their right to participate.
261
 At every level 
there is also a type of a members’ or delegates’ assembly
262
 and an Executive 
Committee.
263
 The delegates’ assembly at the highest level is called the Federal 
Congress which is supposed to be the main decision-making body of the DA
264
 and 
meets ‘at least every two years.’
265
 Like regarding the ANC, I will now have a brief 
look at the implementation of the core values of internal party democracy within the 
DA. I will mainly focus on the highest organisational level of the DA which is called 
the federal level. 
 
Concerning the election of the DA’s leadership (the Federal Council) by the Federal 
Congress,
266
 the same problems arise as within the ANC. First, the Federal Congress 
does compromises ex-officio members.
267
 Unlike the constitution of the ANC (90 per 
cent to 10 per cent), the DA constitution does, however, not expressly state the ratio 
between delegates, who need to be elected at the regional and sub-regional level to 
the Federal Congress, and ex-officio members. The ratio must rather be calculated 
anew every time the Federal Congress meets because it is calculated inter alia on the 
basis of the current number of DA members.
268
 Unfortunately, the DA does not 
disclose its membership figures
269
 which is why the exact ratio between elected 
delegates and ex-officio members can not be calculated at this point. Secondly, not 
all members of the DA’s leadership get elected by the Federal Congress.
270
 Rather, 
the Federal Council does also compromise a fairly high number of ex-officio 
members (more than 50 per cent).
271
 Finally, the DA’s constitution, unlike the 
constitution of the ANC, does not contain any provision which states for how long 
the leadership is elected. Therefore, the degree of internal party democracy within 
the DA regarding the election of the leadership must be considered limited.    
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Like the ANC’s constitution, the constitution of the DA does not regulate the 
selection process of candidates for the National Assembly in detail. Yet, the DA’s 
constitution obliges the Federal Council to adopt regulation in this respect.
272
 Similar 
to the above described Guidelines of the ANC, these regulations
273
 set out the 
various steps which must be taken in order to produce the final candidate list. Similar 
to the selection process of the ANC, the DA’s selection procedure must also be 
considered inconsistent with democratic standards due to the influence of the 
Executive Committees at the various levels. For instance, the regulations provide that 
‘colleges’ and ‘panels’ need to be established in order to pre-select potential 
candidates.
274
 Actually, there would be nothing wrong with such ‘panels’, if they 
only compromised delegates who have been elected to the ‘panels’ by the members. 
However, the composition of these ‘panels’ is heavily shaped by the Executive of the 
respective organisational level of the DA rather than by the DA’s members,
275
 which 
makes the outcome undemocratic. Moreover, it is the Federal Executive that is given 
the authority to strongly influence the candidate list.
276
 The DA’s selection process is 
therefore, like the one of the ANC, substantially shaped by political interventions.  
 
According to the rule 3.8.2 of the DA’s constitution, the branches ‘serve as the 
vehicle for the articulation of the interest of members of the Party.’ Like within the 
ANC, the branches are therefore suppose to be the place where policies are freely 
formulated and debated by the members. The final decision-making authority rest, 
however, with the Federal Congress which is the ‘supreme policy-making body’ of 
the DA.
277
 Similar to the ANC, the Federal Council has, however, the power – 
provided that the Congress is not in session – to ‘formulate policies in matters where 
no policy has been stated or where the policy is not clear or needs to be specifically 
applied, expressed amended or expanded.’
278
 As indicated above, if that power is 
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exercised extensively by the Federal Council to circumvent the Congress in key 
issues, the process of democratic policy development is at stake.       
 
In summary, it can be said the constitutions of the ANC and the DA – even tough 
there is no explicit state regulation in place – recognise forms of internal party 
democracy as they grant their members the right to participate in various ways. In the 
same breath, it must, however, be noted that the degree of internal party democracy 
within the ANC and DA is limited. This applies especially to the selection of 
candidates for the National Assembly.  
 
(d) A party law for South Africa? 
 
As explained elsewhere in this dissertation, I would argue that section 19(1)(b) of the 
South African Constitution requires political parties to apply the core values of 
internal party democracy within their structures. As Pierre de Vos has pointed out, 
the Constitution does, however, not expressly specify the process of democratic 
participation within political parties which is why the legislature has the obligation to 
pass appropriate legislation to ensure and safeguard this process.
279
 This notion can 
mainly be based on the Constitutional Court’s judgment of Glenister v President of 
the Republic of South Africa and Others.
280
 In this case the Constitutional Court had 
to decide whether the legislation which established a new anti-corruption unit passes 
constitutional musters. The majority of the Court inter alia held that although the 
Constitution does not expressly require the state establishing an independent anti-
corruption unit, the Constitution itself nevertheless imposes a duty on the state to 
adopt national legislation in order to create an independent and effective anti-
corruption unit.
281
 Concerning internal party democracy and section 19(1)(b) of the 
Constitution, it is of interest how the Court reached that conclusion. It inter alia 
stated: 
 
‘[T]he starting point is section 7(2), which requires the state to respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. This Court has held that in some circumstances this 
provision imposes a positive obligation on the state and its organs “to provide appropriate 
protection to everyone through laws and structures designed to afford such protection.” 
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Implicit in section 7(2) is the requirement that the steps the state takes to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil constitutional rights must be reasonable and effective.’
282
         
 
Furthermore, the Court invoked section 8(1) of the Constitution. It held:  
 
‘And since in terms of section 8(1), the Bill of Rights “binds the legislature, the executive, 
the judiciary and all organs of state it follows that the executive, when exercising the powers 
granted to it under the Constitution, including the power to prepare and initiate legislation, 
and in some circumstances Parliament, when enacting legislation, must give effect to the 




It could therefore be argued that sections 7(2) and 8(1) of the Constitution read with 
section 19(1)(b) of Constitution (which must be interpreted in the light of the above-
mentioned historical context of section 19, the pivotal role of political parties for the 
South African democracy and the right to vote) imposes a duty on the legislature to 
pass ‘reasonable and effective’ legislation which ensures democratic participation of 
the party members in the activities of the respective political party.
284
 Concerning the 
precise content of a (possible) party law that regulates internal party democracy, the 
legislation must, however, be given enough room to manoeuvre as, according to 
Glenister, ‘there are many ways in which the state can fulfil its duty to take positive 
measures to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.’
285
 
Yet, these measures need to be reasonable.
286
 I would, as already outlined above, 
therefore argue that these measures at least have to give effect to the basic 
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In this paper I sought to deepen the understanding of the legal regulation of internal 
party democracy by examining relevant legal instruments of two countries that 
handle internal party democracy differently. First of all, it has become evident that it 
is still a challenging task to exactly determine what compromises internal party 
democracy. This is, however, not surprising as one can hardly find a commonly 
accepted definition of ‘democracy’ itself. Furthermore, the debate about the necessity 
to regulate the internal functioning of political parties is not yet finished. In my view, 
the cases of both Germany and South Africa have, however, shown that political 
parties play such a crucial role for a democracy that justifies imposing the legal duty 
to organise democratically on them.           
   
The case study of Germany has further revealed that the existing legal framework 
governing internal party democracy in Germany does basically cover the basic 
requirements of internal party democracy which include freedom of speech, 
compliance with the principles of majority rule and periodic elections as well as 
participation of the party members in: the selection process of the candidates for 
local and general elections, the election of the leadership and policy making. All in 
all, the regulatory framework in Germany does not give political parties much room 
for manoeuvres in terms of the core values of internal party democracy. This is why 
the constitutions of political parties in Germany basically have the same content in 
this regard. However, the case study has also revealed loopholes in the law. The PPA 
expressly allows up to 20 per cent ex-officio members in both the delegates’ 
assemblies and the Executive Committees of political parties. This must be 
considered democratically problematic even though the SPD and CDU have not fully 
exploited this loophole according to their constitutions. Another loophole in the 
relevant legislation concerns the selection of the candidate for Chancellor. There are 
no provisions in place governing this selection process. In my view, this loophole has 
been exploited largely by the SPD and CDU as the selection of the respective 
candidate for Chancellor is highly dominated by the party’s leadership.              
 
South Africa is lacking a comprehensive legal framework governing internal party 
democracy. The Electoral Commissions Act and the Electoral Act are especially 
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concerned with the registration of political parties, but they do not impact on the 
internal functioning of political parties. The same applies to the PAJA which, in my 
view, is not of great use when it comes to the protection and enforcement of the basic 
principles of internal party democracy. However, in my opinion, the examination of 
the South African Constitution and the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 
Ramakatsa suggest that section 19(1)(b) of the Constitution requires the right to 
participate in the activities of a political party to be carried out in a democratic 
manner. In other words, at least the protection of the core values of internal party 
democracy is covered by section 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. Moreover, the 
Glenister judgment of the Constitutional Court may allow the conclusion that the 
state has the obligation to pass national legislation in order to ‘protect, promote and 
fulfil’ the ‘right to participate in the activities of a political party.’ The actual need 
for such a party law is apparent from a look at the constitutions of the ANC and DA. 
Although it can not be said that the ANC and the DA are organised entirely in an 
undemocratic manner as they grant their members the right to participate in various 
ways, the study has revealed that in particular the process governing the selection of 
candidates for the general elections is, at the end of the day, determined by the 
Executive Committees rather than by the party’s members. Furthermore, like in 
Germany, ex-officio members play a not insignificant role in both the delegates’ 
assemblies and the Executive Committees of the ANC and DA. In my view, the 
existence of ex-officio members in both German and South African political parties 
indicates that political parties apparently are afraid of completely subjecting 
themselves to democratic minimum standards, even though they claim quite the 
opposite. 
 
All in all, the study has shown that it is premature to conclude that a legal framework 
governing internal party democracy necessarily means that political parties are 
entirely organised in a democratic manner. In the same vein, the lack of a legal 
framework does not necessarily mean that they are completely undemocratic. 
Moreover, the absence of provisions that expressly regulate internal party 
democracy, like in South Africa, does not mean that one can not find other legal 
instruments which can be used to foster and promote internal party democracy. 
However, it needs to be emphasised that this study has been conducted from a formal 
perspective. The inner life of political parties, both in Germany and South Africa, is 
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certainly not only determined by rules set out in party laws or the constitutions of 
political parties but also by informal power relations and patronage networks. In my 
view, a party law can therefore guarantee internal party democracy only to a certain 
extent. The actual challenge seems to be to establish a political culture which 
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